Voluntariness Henry Waldock
Prepared by: Henry Waldock
Revised: May 28, 2010
Current police interrogation techniques use psychological devices to persuade suspects to confess. To win sympathy for the accused at trial, defence counsel will emphasize the imbalance of power between the detained suspect and the sophisticated cop.1 But the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Oickle2 clearly established that not every improper inducement renders a statement involuntary. When a suspect has been well treated, it takes considerable pressure to overwhelm a person’s freedom to choose whether to confess.3
In R. v. Singh4, the court narrowly decided that the police may continue to question a suspect even after the suspect asserts his right to silence.
It is trite law that if the suspect spoke to a “person in authority”5 about the crime, courts will accept evidence of those remarks only if the accused made them voluntarily.
A suspect makes a statement6 voluntarily when:
the suspect had an operating mind
the person in authority did not use threats or promises nor oppression to persuade the suspect to speak
the suspect is not compelled to speak
the police did not use improper trickery
“If an investigator’s conduct passes the scrutiny of the common law rule as to voluntariness, it necessarily satisfies the Charter right to silence.”7
When describing the principles of voluntariness, Iaccobucci J. did not discuss causation. But when applying the principles to facts, he dismissed many inducements as being insufficient to cause Oickle to confess involuntarily.8
The absence or presence of a quid pro quo is a major factor in determining voluntariness.9 Even if the police officer did offer a quid pro quo, the court must determine whether the offered benefit was so great that it raises a doubt whether the will of the subject was overborne.10
Therefore, even where the police have offered inducements, or oppressed or tricked the suspect, question becomes whether these things overwhelmed the suspect’s will11..
The operating mind standard is a low one – schizophrenia,12 intoxication13 and other mental problems14 do not necessarily render a statement involuntary. A person can have an “operating mind” even when so drunk as to be unaware of the consequences of waiving the right to counsel.15 But a low mental capacity renders a suspect more vulnerable to oppression, and so the court may give greater scrutiny to the treatment of the suspect.16
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Proper |
Improper |
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Minimize Moral Gravity of Offence17 |
Minimize Legal Gravity of Offence18 |
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Appeal to spirituality – how do you face your God?19 |
Discuss how confession will impress the judge20 |
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Social appeal – others will respect you |
Discuss sentencing options21 |
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Emotional appeal – you will feel better |
Phrases like “It would be better if you told” or “better tell us everything”22 |
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Develop suspect’s trust23 |
Intimidate24 |
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Comfort the suspect when crying or upset |
Offer quid pro quo – “if you confess for me then I/prosecutor/judge will do X for you”25 |
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Polygraph26 |
Link confession to liberty27 |
The worst inducement in this category is the offer of lenient legal treatment in exchange for a confession or the threat of worse treatment for failure to confess. But other improper inducements include promises of benefits for people close to the suspect28, or psychological treatment for the suspect in exchange for a confession29.
Not every “if you confess then we’ll do X” statement is an improper inducement.30
Sometimes suspects infer or assume that they will obtain an advantage by confessing. In Oickle the court distinguished between inducements offered by the state, and self-inducement.31
A suspect might confess in order to put an end to harsh circumstances,32 Oppressive factors are not necessarily fatal; it depends on what persuades the offender to confess.33
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Proper |
Dangerous |
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Attend the offender’s wellbeing |
Deprive suspect of sleep34 |
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Divert or confirm assertions of the right to silence, and continue questioning35 |
Suggest (in word or action) that questioning won’t end until suspect confesses.36 |
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Let the suspect take bathroom breaks |
Threaten or inflict injury to suspect37 |
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Cigarette breaks |
Confront suspect with false evidence38 |
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Feed the hungry, clothe the naked |
Starve or freeze the suspect39 |
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Limit repeated access to counsel40 |
Deny access to counsel41; Damage relationship between suspect and counsel.42 |
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Confront with evidence or exaggerate evidence43 |
False evidence44 |
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Failure to give the right to silence warning45 |
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Withhold medical attention |
While threats, promises and operating mind issues are to be considered together, trickery is a separate consideration.46
“[T]he investigation of crime and the detection of criminals is not a game to be governed by the Marquess of Queensbury rules. The authorities, in dealing with shrewd and often sophisticated criminals, must sometimes of necessity resort to tricks or other forms of deceit and should not through the rule be hampered in their work. What should be repressed vigorously is conduct on their part that shocks the community. [Emphasis added.]”47
The sorts of “trickery” that the Supreme Court of Canada disapproved of included injecting a diabetic with truth serum instead of insulin, or pretending to be a priest48 in order to get a confession.49 Trickery which brought the justice system into disrepute is to be avoided.50 But tricks which elicit confessions do not of themselves render the confessions involuntary.51
An assertion that a statement is made “off the record” does not render it involuntary.52
Police should always record the suspect’s statement on video or audiotape when possible, but recording it is not a prerequisite to admissibility.53 In the voir dire, the Crown does not need to prove the exact words uttered by the accused,54 nor whether they were true. These are matters for the trier of fact.55 However, the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference if the police could have recorded the conversation on tape or video, but didn’t.56 No such adverse inference should be drawn where the accused insists on turning the recording off.57 Police may turn on the recording device without first seeking the suspect's consent58, but can not record covertly without judicial authorization.59
Before any of the accused's statements may be given in evidence, the trial judge must determine their voluntariness (unless the accused gives a clear and unequivocal waiver).60
Voluntariness is a question of fact; appellate courts must defer to the trial judge’s findings.61 Voluntariness must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; a court may still point at a minor inducement and declare a statement to be involuntary.62
Even after the court finds a statement to be voluntary, the court may also exclude it if its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value.63
If the court does find that police conduct at some point did render the suspect’s remarks involuntary, ask the court to admit as voluntary all conversation which preceded that point. However, the whole of the admissible statement must go before the trier of fact, not just the inculpatory portions.64
Where police conduct was so oppressive as to render a statement involuntary, confessions made after that conduct ceases may still be found involuntary.65
The court must determine whether the officer's tactics in the first interview affected the voluntariness of the statement given in the second. If so, it was “derived” from the first interview, must be excluded.66
It remains an open question whether voluntariness must be proved for a derived statement given to a person other than a person in authority.67
If Crown doesn't want to tender the statement for the truth of its contents, but merely cross-examine the accused, it is preferable to conduct the voir dire in the Crown's case, rather than wait until the accused testifies.68
A confession following interrogation may be found admissible, no matter how many errors the police make if the police errors individually and collectively did not overwhelm the suspect’s ability to choose whether to confess. It is a question of fact, where advocacy matters.
On the other hand, it appears that a court may exclude even a voluntary statement if it is more prejudicial than probative.69
Like Oickle, lengthy and intense interrogations were conducted in the following cases, yet the confessions obtained were admitted:
HMTQ v. Baidwan #1 - 2001 BCSC 1412 aff’d 2003 BCCA 351; #2 11 March 2002, Vancouver CC001678A.
R. v. Ekman (2000), 146 C.C.C. (3d) 346 (B.C.C.A.), 2000 BCCA 414, 2003 BCCA 485
R. v. Ertmoed , 2002 BCSC 806.
Wood (1994) 94 CCC (3d )193 (NSCA) leave to appeal to SCC dismissed
R. v. Edmondson, 2005 SKCA 51
1 For example: Baidwan #2 March 11, 2002 BCSC Vancouver Registry #CC001678A at para 51.
2 R. v. Oickle 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, (2000) 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321
3 R. v. Oickle para 71.
4 R. v. Singh 2007 SCC 48
5 A person in authority is someone who investigates, detains, arrests or prosecutes the accused. See: R. v. Hodgson [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 449; R. v. Wells [1998] 2 S.C.R. 517, 127 C.C.C. (3d) 500; S.G.T., 2010 SCC 20. But an undercover police officer is not a person in authority, even if he pretends to be a gangster who has corrupt contacts with the police. R. v. Grandinetti 2005 SCC 5. A social worker apprehending a baby is not a person in authority. R. v. S.W.M. 2005 BCCA 1466. See also R. v. Mondor 2005 BCSC 292.
6Gestures may be statements. In R. v. Turpin 2005 BCSC 376, the court rejected a suggestion that the accused's washing his hands was a “statement”. A statement is when the suspect attempts to communicate information.
7 HMTQ v. Baidwan No. 1, 2001 BCSC 1412 at para 56; aff’d 2003 BCCA 351
8 R. v. Oickle para 84, 87, 99
In R. v. Osguthorpe 2004 BCSC 1640:Wong J. said: “I have given consideration to [defence’s] concerns, but conclude they are not causative factors for the accused when he confessed …”.
9 R. v. Bakker 2003 BCSC 599 at paras 90 & 95; R. v. Crockett 2002 BCCA 658 (2002) 170 C.C.C. (3d) 569, (2002) 7 C.R. (6th) 300 at para 28; R. v. Grouse 2004 NSCA 108.
In R v. Zhang 2004 BCSC 826 where the police offers of legal advantage were followed by responses from the suspect indicating his interest, and ultimately, a confession, the statement was found involuntary.
10 R. v. Spencer, 2007 S.C.C. 11 at para 13-15.
11 R. v. Carpenter 2001 BCCA 31, (2001) 151 C.C.C. (3d) 205 at para 69; R. v. Malik, Bagri & Reyat 2003 BCSC 20 at para 69; R. v. Labbe 2002 BCSC 996 (appeal allowed on other grounds: (2001) 159 C.C.C. (3d) 529 (BCCA)) at para 37
13 R. v. Oldham (1970) 1 C.C.C. (2d) 141 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. McKenna [1961] 1 S.C.R. 660; R. v. Richard (1980) 56 C.C.C. (2d) 129 (BCCA), R. v. Labbe 2002 BCSC 996 (appeal allowed on other grounds: (2001) 159 C.C.C. (3d) 529 (BCCA)). In R. v. Legato (2002) 172 C.C.C. (3d) 415 (Que C.A.), the accused had received morphine injections before speaking to the police. Statement found voluntary. R. v. Pavlovszky, 2005 NBCA 9.
14 R. v. Santinon 11 C.C.C. (2d) 121 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Nagotcha [1980] 1 S.C.R. 714 51 CCC (2d) 353.
15 Pavlovszky, 2005 NBCA 9.
16 R. v. Oickle paragraph 42.
17 R. v. Speidel 2003 BCSC 1532; R. v. Bakker 2003 BCSC 599;
18 In some interrogations, the investigating officer referred to less serious legal consequences in circumstances in which the suspect may have made the link. Eg Oickle; Baidwan unreported March 11, 2002 BCSC Vancouver Registry #CC001678A;
19 R. v. MacNeil (1995), 138 N.S.R. (2d) 117 (N.S.C.A.), leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused September 14, 1995
20 Oblique references to legal process while minimizing moral gravity do not necessarily constitute improper inducements. HMTQ v. Baidwan No. 1, 2001 BCSC 1412 at para 53; aff’d 2003 BCCA 351; but telling the prisoner that 2nd degree murder will attract a minimum 10-year sentence is just plain wrong. R v. Alexis & Monk 2002 BCCA 103. Telling the suspect that he must convince the officer, the judge and the jury is a problem. R. v. Espadilla 2005 BCSC 174.
21 R. v. Warren (1997) 117 C.C.C. (3d) 418 (N.W.T.C.A.) Leave to appeal refused [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 483. When trying to persuade Warren to confess, the officer said: If he confessed, apologized and explained that the blast was not intended to kill the miners, he would be looking at a manslaughter charge and might only serve a few years; but if he did not confess and apologize, he would be viewed as a cold, uncaring person and would be treated more harshly by the police and the prosecutors' office. The trial judge was satisfied by the evidence that these inducements did not move Warren to give the confession.
22 R. v. Hogben [1993] B.C.J. No. 458 (BCCA)
23 R. v. Malik, Bagri & Reyat 2003 BCSC 20
24 Suggesting that the death penalty still exists in Canada may be oppressive. R. v. Espadilla. 2005 BCSC 174
25 In R. c. Bégin (2002) 168 C.C.C. (3d) 83, 6 C.R. (6th) 360 (Qué C.A.), the murderer was also a police informer. He confessed to a murder to his handlers in exchange for lenient treatment and protection from the gang against whom he informed. Confession excluded.
In R. v. Spencer 2007 SCC 11, the accused offered to confess if doing so would protect his girlfriend from criminal prosecution. The police officer did not accept this offer; but had they, this may well have rendered the statement involuntary.
26 R v. McIntosh (1999) 141 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont CA) leave to appeal dismissed [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 81.
27 In R. v. Backhouse, 2005 Ont CA the police officer told the suspect if he gave an alibi which was confirmed, he would be released. This was merely an accurate assessment of the situation, not an improper inducement.
28 R. v. Jackson (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 35 (B.C.C.A.) ; But not all such promises will render a confession involuntary: R. v. Billings 2004 BCSC 456.
29 A promise to get the guy help may cause him to confess. If so, the statement is inadmissible. But R. v. Ewert (1991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 207 (B.C.C.A.) decided to confess for other reasons, and so the offer didn’t render the statement involuntary.
30 In R. v. Teske (2005 Ont CA), the police officer told the suspect that if he confessed, he would be arrested and charged; if he did not confess, they would release him, but the police would ask social workers to apprehend his children, for their safety. The court found this was not an improper inducement. See also R. v. Backhouse, 2005 Ont CA
31 R. v. Oickle at para 57; see also R. v. Henri, [2001] A.J. No. 462 (Q.B.); R. v. Carpenter 2001 BCCA 31, (2001) 151 C.C.C. (3d) 205.
32 Hoilett (1999 Ont CA) Sex offender was drunk and high. Arrested at 11:25pm. Clothing taken for forensic purposes. Naked for 1.5 hours. Given a bunny suit. Woken at 3:00am for an interview. Fell asleep 5 times during the interview. Confession not voluntary
33 In R. v. Grouse 2004 NSCA 8, police used aggressive, profane language, falsely asserted the existence of incriminating evidence, and applied “good cop, bad cop” techniques. Because the suspect returned aggression with aggression, the court found the evidence showed his will was not overborne.
34 Baidwan #1 & #2: Unreported March 11, 2002 BCSC Vancouver Registry #CC001678A.
35 R. v. Singh 2007 SCC 48 – An interrogator who ignores the suspect's assertions of his right to silence may create an impression that the interrogation won't end until the suspect answers questions. This vitiates voluntariness. However, continuing to discuss the offence after an assertion of the right to silence does not necessarily create this impression. This was a 5:4 decision. The dissenters would have required the police to stop asking questions after the first assertion of the right to silence.
McCrimmon, 2008 BCCA 487
In R. v. Rybak, 2008 ONCA 354, the officers questioned the suspect for 7 hours, during which he repeatedly asserted his unwillingness to say anything. Because the officers affirmed his right to silence and treated him appropriately, the statement was found to be voluntary.
Older cases which address this include:
Wood (1994) 94 CCC (3d )193 (NSCA) leave to appeal to SCC dismissed
R. v. Bohnet 2003 ABCA 207.
R. v. Roy (2003) 180 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (Ont C.A.) (8 hours of questioning)
R. v. Timm (1998) 131 CCC (3d) 306 (Que CA) aff'd [1999] 3 S.C.R. 666;
R. v. Van Haarlem (1991), 64 C.C.C. (3d) 543 (BCCA) (affirmed 71 C.C.C. (3d) 448 (S.C.C.))
Baidwan #2 March 11, 2002 BCSC
R. v. Turpin 2005 BCSC 376
R. v. Sarrazin (2005 Ont C.A.)
R. v. Edmondson, 2005 SKCA 51
R. v. Teske (2005 Ont CA).
R. v. Spidel 2003 BCSC 1532.
R. v. Black 2007 BCSC 1366
36 Where a man with limited vocabulary and low IQ repeatedly asserted his right to silence and a desire to speak to his lawyer, the judge found that the police officer’s repeated questioning violated his right to silence. R. v. Otis (2000) 151 C.C.C. (3d) 416 (Que C.A.) leave to appeal denied. Similarly, R. v. Chamberlain 2003 MBQB 209 (Man. Q.B.); R. v. Fitzgerald, 2009 BCSC 1599
Similarly, in R. v. Flett 2004 MBQB 143 (Man. Q.B.), two women repeatedly asserted that they had nothing to say, but police persisted for hours to question, giving the impression that there was no way out. The court relied upon Otis in finding a breach of s.7. See also R. v. Felker 2009 BCSC 408 - interviewing an old man from 8:00pm to 2:00am despite his repeated requests for the interview to end.
37 R. v. Sabri [2002] O.J. No 2202, 166 C.C.C. (3d) 179 (Ont CA)
38 R. v. McMillan [2003] O.J. No. 3489 (Ont CA)– officer produces a forged “confession” of McMillan’s partner in crime. McMillan spills the beans. Crown prohibited from cross-examining McMillan on the statement to police.
In R. v. Wiegand, 2003 ABQB 283, the police lied about fingerprints at the scene, and an eyewitness after the scene. This, combined with an implied threat to tell his daughter that he was trying to commit suicide was found to raise a doubt that the confession was voluntary.
However, in R. v. Fabas, 2008 BCSC 677, although police referred to non-existent evidence, other tactics persuaded the suspect to confess. After reviewing similar decisions, the court admitted the confession.
39 R. v. Hoilett (1999) 136 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (Ont C.A.) was kept naked on a cold metal bunk for an hour. However, consider also that Oickle was interrogated late into the night, and again early in the morning.
40 R. v. Singh 2007 SCC 48; McCrimmon, 2008 BCCA 487; R. v. Sinclair 2008 BCCA 127; R. v. Ekman 2000 BCCA 414 146 CCC (3d) 346 para 25; R. v. Roper (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 204 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Gormley (1999), 140 C.C.C. (3d) 110 (P.E.I.S.C. App. Div.); R. v. Mayo (1999) 133 CCC 3d 168 (Ont CA).
41 R. v. Freisen 2003 BCSC 1760; R. v. P.L.R (1988) 44 C.C.C. (3d) 174 (N.S.C.A.)
42R. v. Burlingham [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206; R. v. Edmonson 2005 SKCA 51.
43 R. v. Watts 2003 BCSC 1403; R. v. Riley & Henry 2001 BCSC 1169 (Romilly J.) aff’d (2003) 179 C.C.C. (3d) 307 (BCCA); Baidwan #1 2001 BCSC 1412 aff’d 2003 BCCA 351; R. v. Edmonson (Sask C.A. 2005). In R. v. Grouse 2004 NSCA 108, the police used aggressive confrontation, but that tactic did not elicit the confession – later gentler discussion did the trick.
In R. v. Amyot (1990), 58 C.C.C. (3d) 312 & R. v. Fowler (1979) 23 Nfld. & PEIR. 255 (Nfld C.A.), the courts called it a “psychological sledgehammer” to tell suspects they failed a polygraph. In Oickle, the court expressed reservations about this description (see paras 95 – 97), and accepted exaggeration as an acceptable tactic (see paras 99-100)
44 R. v. Riley & Henry 2001 BCSC 1169 (Romilly J.) aff’d (2003) 179 C.C.C. (3d) 307 (BCCA); R. v. Oickle at para 61: lies about evidence, standing alone
45 R. v. Boudreau [1949] S.C.R. 262; See also R. v. Dupuis [1952] 2 S.C.R. 516.
46 R. v. Spencer 2007 SCC 11 at para 12
47 R. v. Oickle at paragraph 66
48 In R. v. Clot, (1982) 69 C.C.C. (2d) 367 (Que S.C.), police received the accused from a psychiatric hospital. One officer pretended to be a priest, and another officer pretended to be a psychologist. Between them, they obtained a confession from a mentally ill suspect. It was not admitted at trial. On the other hand, Mr Rowe (2006 Ont C.A.), a bank robber who shot and killed a bank clerk, consulted a practitioner of Caribean black magic for the purpose of obtaining magical protection from police detection and arrest. But the magician was, by his own admission, a fake, who wore wire for the police. Was the confession he elicited from Rowe admissible? The court found it was because of Mr Rowe's illegal purposes in seeking the magician's assistance.
49 See also R. v. Collins [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 at para 41: “resort to tricks that are not in the least unlawful … should not result in the exclusion of a free and voluntary statement unless the trick resorted to is a dirty trick, one that shocks the community…”
50 In R. v. Choney, (1908) 7 W.L.R. 537, 17 Man. R. 467, 13 C.C.C. 289 (Man C.A.), police enlisted the aid of an interpreter to speak to the suspect in his own language. The interpreter had assisted this suspect communicate with his lawyer in the past. The interpreter pretended to be doing so again, but revealed all the communications to the police. The court refused to admit this evidence, calling it privileged.
51 In R. v. Pettipiece, (1972) 7 C.C.C. (2d) 133 (B.C.C.A.), police pretended to release the robbery suspect into the hands of a shady bondsman. The JP and the bondsman were police officers. The admissions he made to the “bondsman” were admissible.
In R. v. Black, 2007 BCSC 1366, the police put the accused's girlfriend into cells with him, overtly recording their conversation. She pleaded with him to tell the truth. Because she did not make her continuing relationship with him contingent on his confession, no “inducement” was offered. There was nothing improper about this tactic.
52 R. v. Fairfield, 23 B.C.A.C. 167, 39 W.A.C. 167, [1993] B.C.W.L.D. 581 (BCCA); R. v. Moran, 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont C.A.). R. v. Smith, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 368. See also the tangled history of R. v. Ewert 68 C.C.C. (3d) 207 (B.C. C.A.) reversed by R. v Ewert, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 161.
53 R. v. Richards (1997), 6 C.R. (5th) 154 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Ducharme 2004 MBCA 29 (Man C.A.); R. v. Turpin 2005 BCSC 376 (B.C.S.C.). In R. v. Groat 2006 BCCA 27, the police stumbled upon a grow-op, while checking a 911 call for break-and-enter. The accused answered the door, and the police conversed with him for 20 minutes. No recording, but the court saw no requirement for recording.
54 R. v. Satkunananthan (2001) 152 CCC (3d) 321 (Ont CA).
55 R. v. Gauthier (1975) 27 C.C.C. (2d) 14 (S.C.C.); R. v. MacKenzie [1993] 1 S.C.R. 212.
56 Ontario Court of Appeal takes the strongest view of this: R. v. Moore-McFarlane (2001), 160 C.C.C. (3d) 493 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Ahmed (2002), 170 C.C.C. (3d) 27 (Ont C.A.) R. v. Sabri (2002 Ont C.A.). In obiter, in R. v. Swanek (2005 Ont CA), they suggest that the jury might, in the appropriate case, be warned of the danger of relying upon such a statement. See also: R. v. Wilson (2006 Ont C.A.); R. v. Philogene (2006 Ont C.A.)
However, in R. v. H. (L.K.), 2006 NSCA 104, 41 C.R. (6th) 298, 213 C.C.C. (3d) 96 (N.S.C.A.), the court found it was an error to exclude the confession merely because of the poor quality of the video.
In R. v. Young, (2006 Ont S.C.J.), the accused refused to permit the police to videotape his conversation with them. The court found this a sufficient explanation for the failure to record.
58 R. v. Young, 2009 ONCA 891.
59 R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30.
60 R. v. Nguyen, 2007 BCCA 397 (B.C.C.A.)
61 Oickle para 22; R. v. Tessier 2002 SCC 6 reversing R. v.. Tessier (2001), 153 C.C.C. (3d) 361 (NBCA)
62 R. v. Bunn 2001 MBCA 12: “Obviously, having regard to the first sentence of the passage I have just quoted, the final sentence must be qualified by the need for the Crown to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused's belief in the advantage to be gained by a confession was not induced or confirmed by persons in authority. There is thus no onus on the accused to prove that his or her confession was induced by a promise or that he or she was misled. It is sufficient to exclude the statement that the accused believed it would be to his or her advantage to make the statement and there is a reasonable doubt as to whether this belief was the result of an inducement held out by the police.”
63 R. v. Sodhi (2003 Ont C.A.)
64 R. v. Allison (1991) 68 C.C.C. (3d) 375 (B.C.C.A.)
65R. v. Bateman, 2006 CarswellOnt 3417 (Ont. S.C..J.).
66 R. v. I. (L.R.) and T. (E.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 504
67 S.G.T., 2010 SCC 20: An officer obtained a confession and apology for a sexual offence by suggesting that the accused still obtain parental access to another child if he demonstrated his remorse for the offence. The accused later confessed to the mother of the victim. The court found that the later confession was insufficiently linked to the former confession to be “derived” from it.
68R. v. Turpin 2005 BCSC 475
69R. v. Barges (2005 Ont S.C.J.)
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