Legal Topics for Canadian Criminal Investigators

2025.10.03 Reasonable Expectations of Privacy - No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in a Publically-shared IP Address

There's an odd contrast between the gratification that child pornographers get from exposing the privacy of children, and the indignation they express when police expose their private activity.

Mr Tate, 2025 BCSC 1462 shared child sexual abuse images using a P2P file-sharing network.

When police caught him, he complained that police obtained his IP address without a warrant. All the evidence they collected should be thrown out of court.

He had a point.

In R. v. Bykovets, 2024 SCC 6 , the Supreme Court of Canada seemed to say that all IP addresses are always private. Police need warrants in order to obtain them.

But when Mr Tate used the P2P program to share his pornography, Mr Tate published his IP address on the internet, for millions of strangers to see. That's how P2P programs work. How could he reasonably expect privacy in something he exposed to the world to see?

Justice Morley carefully interpreted Bykovets, and reached a sensible interpretation: IP addresses may sometimes lose their privacy. Depending on the facts.

2025.09.18 Presentation at Douglas College

Today, I'll teach some legal topics to students at Douglas College. I prepared some materials for them, which may be found here.

2025.09.17 What to Do with What you Seized - Can you Make Space in the Exhibit Locker?

When police officers searched Mr Hollaman's 2025 BCCA 315 place, they took drugs, cash, a tazer, clothing and documents of residency. They forgot to give a copy of the warrant to someone in charge of the place.

As required by s.489.1 of the Criminal Code, Cst Martin reported what he seized to a justice. The justice granted him an order to keep the stuff for 90 days.

Charge approval took a while. The order lapsed for almost 3 months. Cst Martin's office had a system to track these orders, but this one got overlooked.

Cst Martin got a new order under s.490(9.1), which permitted him to keep the stuff for a while longer. Cst Martin told Mr Hollaman that when the order expired, he could have some of the property back.

That order expired. Charges proceeded several months later.

At trial, Mr Hollaman's lawyer complained that the police breached his rights under s.8 of the Charter by:

• failing to execute the warrant according to the legal requirements;
• holding his property for periods of time, without lawful authority.

The trial judge didn't see much of a problem, and convicted Mr Hollaman. The appeal court judges did see some problems, concluded that the Charter breaches weren't that important:

• Hanging on to the cash and the score sheets without lawful authority represented a continuing breach of Mr Hollaman's privacy; but not a big one because the police already knew what they contained.
• Offering to return items to Mr Hollaman reduced the seriousness of the breach.
  
• The police could have reduced the seriousness of the breach even further if they had made copies of the documents and returned the originals, pursuant to s.490(13). If all you have is documents, you can use that section to resolve the ongoing applications for further detention by giving the documents back.
  
• Since the execution of this warrant, Parliament amended the Criminal Code to increase the obligations on you to bring copies of warrants to give to the people in the places you search. Always bring copies to search scenes.
  

2025.09.10 Record Retention Policies - When Can You Clear the File Room?

Throwing out records can have serious consequences.

Almost 40 years ago, Mr Burke, 2025 ONCA 619 kidnapped and raped two young women. He fled the Canada, and imported his brand of mayhem to the USA.

When they caught him, American authorities imposed a 52-year sentence on him. (That's a tariff on a Canadian export I can live with. I apologize to the Americans for giving them Mr Burke.)

How long should Canadian authorities hang onto exhibits and records?

One of the two women gave a false name. I guess she was ashamed of the horror he put her through. Police lost track of her. Crown withdrew the charges relating to her.

In 2000, American jail authorities told Canadian police that Mr Burke wouldn't likely get parole before 2040. In 2013, Canadian police destroyed materials relating to the woman who gave a false name.

But 2015, he got parole early. Police found the missing woman. And some records - including hospital records - still survived. The Crown relaid those charges.

The defence asked the trial judge to stay the proceedings because the Crown destroyed critical evidence.

With respect to those lost records, the trial judge agreed with the Crown that police could not be expected to hold on to records forever. As long as police comply with "a reasonable record retention policy", the court will (probably) not criticize police.

But the police destroyed other records and exhibits relating to the other woman. Not in accordance with their record retention policies.

The judge might have dropped charges. She didn't in this case because there were ways to keep the trial fair.

She convicted Mr Burke. The appeal court agreed with her decision. Mr Burke must pay the price in Canada too.

Those of you who draft policies might think that after a conviction, you can throw out records. Not so fast. You will find many examples of cases where the records mattered even years after the conviction. See the "Old News" page for 2023.04.30, 2021.08.29, 2018.04.12, 2017.08.12, and even back in 2013.

2025.09.10 Securing Video - Is the Time Stamp Accurate? How much video?

When Mr Hernandez-Viera, 2025 ONCA 626 attempted to murder someone he knew, security video captured his vehicle arrive at precisely 1:43pm. (It left shortly thereafter.)

Perhaps he concealed his face from the video: the security system didn't record enough of his face to identify him.

An investigator seized the video anyway.

Smart move.

But it appears that the investigator did not check that the security system recorded the correct date and time. The prosecutor did not lead evidence at trial of its accuracy.

That mattered, because Mr Hernandez-Viera's car recorded a GPS track. That track showed that his car arrived at that location at 1:43pm.

Defence counsel argued that the match of time-stamps could be just a coincidence. Perhaps the security video actually captured Mr Hernandez-Viera's car at some earlier time. If the security clock had not been updated for day-light savings time, then the security video would have recorded his car arrive and depart an hour before the terrible event. And it wouldn't be surprising if he visited her - they knew each other.

If the investigator seized only one video, that argument might have worked. But these investigators obtained video from two independent security systems. Both of them showed the events of 1:43pm.  The judges figured that it would be wildly unlikely that two video recording systems would record the same wrong timestamp. And there were some other coincidences which tended to identify Mr Hernandez-Viera as the shooter. The trial judge convicted him and the appeal court upheld the conviction.

Your luck might differ. Suppose there had only been one security video system.

When seizing security video, I think investigators should:

1. always ensure that the date-stamp is accurate; and
2. seize enough video that you can find an independently verifiable event, especially after the event of interest.
   

What do I mean "independently verifiable event"?

If you respond to a bank robbery, then make sure that the video that you seize includes the arrival of the first responders. This provides continuity of the scene (did anyone remove or add evidence), and a way to prove, through those first responders, that the time on the video system matches the time on their watches/phones.

2025.09.06 Warrant Drafting - Why do I Think It's There?

This comment and the next one touch on similar points. Please forgive me for repeating fundamental and important points. It's just that they're ... um ... important.

When you ask a justice for a search warrant, you need to explain what evidence you want to look for, and why you think it will be in the place you want to search. In the case of Mr Guenter, 2025 BCCA 308, the cop figured it was obvious that a search would discover evidence in his house. The defence disagreed.

In 2022, people working for Google noticed that a user of their Google Drive service (online data storage) had uploaded child exploitation images. They disclosed to law enforcement agencies:

• the name and email address associated to the account
• the IP address used to upload the child pornography.

The IP address led the police to a Virtual Private Network server - a dead end. (A VPN conceals the IP address of the person using the internet.)

The phone number started with "604" - a BC area code. For that reason, American investigators sent the information to the BC Integrated Child Exploitation team. BC investigators found the email address and phone number in BC law enforcement databases for events in 2013 and 2020. Mr Guenter's name appeared in those entries as the user of that email address and number. A BC officer looked up Mr Guenter's driver's licence data, and got a residential address.

He sought a warrant to search that residence for electronic devices that could store data relevant to the child pornography. He explained that electronic devices can retain valuable data, even after they are no longer being used to access the data sought.

His ITO explained why he thought that:

• Mr Guenter still lived at that address, and
  
• Mr Guenter's electronic devices would retain data of interest to the investigation.

The ITO did not explain why he thought that the devices that contained evidence of interest to the investigation would be at his residence.

His search discovered devices. After applying for another warrant, he found evidence in those devices of Mr Guenter collecting and dealing with child sexual abuse.

The trial judge agreed with defence argument. He threw out the evidence because the ITO contained no specific evidence which showed that the devices that uploaded the images to Google Drive or accessed them there would be in Mr Guenter's house.

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge. Those judges held that you don't need case specific evidence to support common-sense inferences. In this case, they felt that it was common sense to expect that Mr Guenter would keep his electronic devices at his home.

Careful!

Such common sense in once case may not apply to the next.

For example, judges may not draw the same inference with respect to drugs held for sale. Compare the differences between this child pornography user and a drug dealer:

One may infer that the possession of child sexual abuse images is for sexual gratification. Therefore, he needs to keep his images where he can enjoy them in private. Definitely not something to use at the workplace or in a motor vehicle. A drug dealer has different concerns. He might dip into his supply to get high. He might keep his supply at home for convenience, but nothing compels him to keep his supply close. Indeed, to foil police searches, he may prefer to store them somewhere else, like a girlfriend's apartment, or in a secret compartment in his car.

One may infer that Mr Guenter likely made no profit from his images. Therefore, unless he was rich and remarkably careful, he would not likely rent or buy some other private place at which to indulge his interest. But drug dealing is notoriously profitable. A dealer may be able to afford a storage locker.

For this reason, be cautious of relying on common sense to answer the question "Why do you think the thing you want is in the target's home?"

If you know the places that your target goes, and you can logically eliminate all but one as likely places for the evidence or contraband to be, then you've got reasonable grounds to search that place.

2025.08.18 Warrant Drafting - What am I Looking For and Why?

When you ask a justice for a search warrant, you need to explain what evidence you want to look for, and why you think it will be in the place you want to search.

When a woman complained that Mr Shen, 2025 ONCA 584 raped her, they investigated. Their efforts led to his cell phone. They asked a justice for a warrant authorizing them to search it for photos and communications.

When they executed it, they found in his phone a video of the complainant which corroborated her story.

At trial, defence complained that the warrant permitted police to search for "photos" and "communications", but not "videos". They asked the trial judge to exclude this critical evidence.

In this case, the trial judge and the appeal court judges gave the police officer a pass. This ITO explained that the communications sought could include pictures and videos. Therefore, the warrant authorized the searchers to look for videos as part of the communications.

But the basic principle matters: a warrant gives the searchers authority to look only for the things it identifies. When you draft your application, describe the all of things that you want the searchers to be permitted to look for.

But there's another principle that often gets overlooked. Officers sometimes confuse probative value with reasonable grounds. I mention this not because it was a problem in the Shen case, but it came up in my work.

Suppose that you are investigating a terrible axe-murder. You want to find the blood-covered axe. Suppose you want to search my house for it. No doubt, finding it in my house would advance your investigation. But no judge will give you a warrant to search my house for that axe until you explain why you think that it's there.

This week, I reviewed an application to search electronic devices. The experienced officer described all sorts of useful evidence that might be in the devices. For example, he explained that if the target photographed any of the criminal property, those photographs would show that he was connected to it.

Read that last sentence again.

Does that sentence explain why the justice should expect that those photographs are going to be in the devices?

Nope.

It only explains how useful that evidence would be if police were to find it.

The ITO did not go any further. It did not explain why in this case the target would have photographed the criminal property. Although the justice granted the application, I think that the poor drafting will become a problem at trial.

Often, explaining why the evidence will advance the investigation helps the justice decide to grant the warrant. But you need to go further, and explain why you think that evidence will be there.

(In case my example raised your suspicions, I stoutly deny possessing any blood-covered axes at the moment, and furthermore, I refuse to consent to a police search for any of them. Especially not in my basement, beside the file boxes. ;-) )

2025.07.30 Use of Force - Reports, Testimony and Video

Mistreating prisoners can undermine prosecutions, especially if the use of force reports come across as self-serving.

The Crown had a strong case against Mr Gilmore-Bent, 2025 ONCA 553 with respect to a loaded handgun. He beat the charges anyway.

How?

He had the good fortune to be pepper-sprayed. But that wasn't enough. Lady Luck blessed him with some clumsy accounting.

While he was in custody in the Toronto East Detention Centre, awaiting trial, some other inmate punched a correctional officer. That officer sprayed OC foam into Mr Gilmore-Brent's face.

The officer and several colleagues wrote reports about it afterwards, describing how Mr Gilmore-Brent lunged at the officer, which justified the spraying.

Security video contradicted their accounts.

At court, Mr Gilmore-Bent explained that after the one prisoner punched the officer, he tried to get into his cell, but it was locked. Eventually, when someone unlocked it, he obeyed the officer's instruction to go to his cell. The route to his door took him slightly closer to the officer, and so he did approach to officer briefly. Only after he entered his cell did the officer start to spray him.

Although the security camera didn't see into his cell, the video it recorded tended to support his version.

From the similarity of the reports written by the guards that witnessed the event, the trial judge inferred that they colluded. She believed that they made up a false story to protect one of their own.

Astonishingly, a senior correctional officer watched the security video, and then signed off on each report that it was accurate.

Was complacency at play? Did the correctional officers rarely experience challenges to their reports? I don't know. I have seen in some institutions, that people in authority, such as prison guards, sometimes develop a sense of invulnerability.

The trial judge threw out serious charges. That result probably annoyed the police officers who investigated Mr Gilmore-Bent.

What can an honest cop learn from this unhappy tale of failure in a correctional facility?

1. Someone may read the report that you write about using force, or witnessing another officer use force.
2. That person may compare your report with other reports, or with video which recorded the event.
3. They will be looking for differences. If they find any, they will use them against you.
   
4. Therefore, try to record as accurately as you can what you yourself observed.

Honest errors happen. As I understand the experts, our brains process observations differently from video-recorders. In tense situations, we will focus hard on one thing, and entirely miss another. (If you haven't seen the video which demonstrates selective attention, then follow the link. It will test you. See if you can get the answer right.)

What can a supervisor learn from this unhappy tale?

1. Before the incident takes on a life of its own, read all of the reports, and compare their contents with each other, and any video you might have.
2. Don't necessarily discipline officers for disagreeing. Honest errors differ from dishonest collusion.
3. Avoid creating environments which foster the appearance of collusion. For example, don't debrief the group before they write their reports. One officer's remarks may inadvertently affect how the next one write his or her report.
   

What can a correctional officer learn from this incident?

1. Sometimes, an adversary will read your use of force report critically.
2. Therefore, precision matters.
3. When the adversary challenges you, they will want to know when you wrote your report, and whether you discussed the event with any other witnesses. You might want to avoid that.

Many officers demand the right to watch the video before writing their report. Careful what you ask for. If your report matches the video, your adversary will point out that this undermines your credibility. The judge is more likely to trust your word about what happened outside the view of the camera if the video independently confirms at least some of your recollections.

2025.07.28 What to Do when Defence Counsel Yells "Privilege!"

A kind reader in Alberta brought the decision of R v El-Sayed, 2025 ABKB 336 to my attention. He impressed me. I thank him.

An officer in his police service persuaded a justice to issue a warrant to search a drug dealer's house and vehicles. In the course of the search, the officers lawfully seized cell phones, which they intended to search for further evidence.

Mr El-Sayed's lawyer asserted that the cell phones contained privileged communications, and demanded that the police return them. Police refused. Crown asked the defence lawyer to help police identify what data was privileged so as to avoid examining it.

The defence lawyer refused to help the police in this search of the client's phone.

Judges take solicitor-client privilege very seriously. When you encounter communications between a lawyer and their client in which the client seeks confidential legal advice or the lawyer gives it, step back in alarm. Whether written or spoken, such communications enjoy the highest protection that the common law recognizes. Even a lawyer's bill for services rendered enjoys this protection. If you snoop through this material without specific judicial authorization, you can expect bad consequences.

In this case, some smart people drafted an application to search the phone in ways that obtained evidence relevant to trafficking, but avoided communications with legal counsel. It required the technicians searching it filter out data related to certain named lawyers and their phone numbers, and forbade them from communicating the content of any privileged material to the investigating officers. See para 58 of the decision for more details. The application explained the defence lawyer's claim, and refusal to help.

Unsurprisingly, the searches found evidence.

Unsurprisingly, defence counsel complained at trial that the police should have done more to protect privilege.

The trial judge rejected this complaint. While it is true that the defendant and his lawyer bear no duty to assist the police in investigating the defendant, the lawyer does bear a duty to assert privilege. The most efficient and effective way for the lawyer to protect the privilege is to help steer the police away from the privileged material. That's not helping the police find evidence against the client; it's just protecting the privileged communications.

On the law enforcement side, it seems reasonable to ask: "Why should the police do more to protect privilege if the lawyer himself refused to do anything?"

The answer is that you have an obligation to uphold privilege, whether the defence helps or not. The better question to ask is "How much is enough?"

In this case, the judge found that the terms of the warrant sufficed. Your mileage may differ. As the judge noted, every case is different. Sometimes, you must bring in an independent referee (a lawyer) who will examine material to determine whether it is privileged.

If you have reason to suspect that the phone / computer / residence that you will search contains privileged communications, then, at the very least, include language in the warrant which requires you to seal up such material if you encounter it, and bring it to a judge to determine if it is indeed privileged. If you have reason to believe that your search will encounter such material, then get advice. You might even impress your advisor if you bring the El-Sayed decision to their attention.

2025.06.09 Production Orders - Who is a "Person"?

I missed this decision last year when it came out. I think it's interesting enough to comment on even a year later.

A production order requires a person to produce documents or data. Section 487.014 says that a "justice or judge may order a person to produce" the material you want in your investigation. And s.??? says if they don't, they can be charged with an offence.

But most of the data and documents you obtain with these orders come from big organizations, like telecoms companies. If your production order names a particular staff member of the big corporation from which you want evidence, then that guy or gal becomes liable to criminal prosecution if they fall behind on their work. Not entirely fair to that poor sod.

I gather that some of those big organizations ask you to name the organization rather than a person.

That works. Section 2 of the Criminal Code defines "person" to include "organization". It defines "organization" to include corporations, municipalities, and trade unions.

Therefore, it's easy to stop thinking about how you name the "person" that must produce the documents or data that you want.

When investigating Mr Wahabi, 2024 MBCA 70 and his associates for a murder, Manitoban police officers needed private records from two correctional centres: Milner Ridge Correctional Centre (MRCC) and Headingley Correctional Centre (HCC). Quite properly, they applied for production orders, which identified the records and data they sought. But the production orders named the correctional centres as the "persons" required to produce the records.

Defence counsel argued out that MRCC and HCC were places, not people. They had a point. A similar argument succeeded in R v Meyers, 2017 SKQB 29, and evidence was excluded from that trial.

But section 2 also defines "organization" to include an association of persons created for a common purpose, with an operational structure, which presents itself to the public as an association of persons. (Therefore, if a quilting club votes in a president and a treasurer, then the quilting club is "person" for the purposes of production orders.)

The judges observed that at these places, a highly structured organization of people (prison guards and their management) housed, fed and managed prisoners on behalf of the provincial government. Therefore, the names of those places "MRCC" and "HCC" sufficiently identified the "organizations" of people that ran them.

Whew! The production orders were therefore good, and the murder trial could proceed.

If you use loose language to identify the group of people who must produce the evidence you seek, you might not be so lucky.

Whenever you apply for a production order, recall that you are asking for an order against a "person". That "person" can be a corporation.

If you know the legal name of the corporation, then use that, even if it's just a numbered company. (Make sure you spell the name correctly.)

If you don't know the legal name, then you can use the name by which it advertizes itself.

If it doesn't advertize itself, then you may need to prove in your ITO who these people are, and that they have an operational structure, and how they present themselves to the public. What name does grandma's quilting club hang over its booth at the Christmas craft fair?

If you can't figure out what to call this group of people, then figure out which one of them has the documents you need. And name that individual person in your ITO.

2025.06.10

 Wiretap and Production Orders - What do Friends Talk About?

When applying for wiretap or production of recording of conversations, one of the things that you must establish is the likelihood that the people will or did talk about the matter that you are investigating.

Here's some judicial language that might help:

“It is a reasonable inference that persons who are known to one another and who trust one another are likely to speak to one another about areas of mutual interest and concern” Wahabi, 2024 MBCA 70 at para 96.

The judges were commenting on whether a production order was justified. What do you think?

There was an ongoing feud between rival gangs. Mr Wahabi, 2024 MBCA 70, and his buddy Hagos belonged to one gang. Someone murdered Wahabi's brother. After that murder, Hagos went to jail. Jail logs showed that Wahabi and Hagos communicated frequently. The jail telephone system recorded those conversations.

Then someone murdered a member of the rival gang. Two reliable confidential sources said that Wahabi and Hagos planned it and Wahabi and others committed it.

Should a judge authorize the production of the recorded conversations between Wahabi and Hagos? Was there any reason to expect that those conversations would reveal information about the second murder?

The Court of Appeal sure thought so: "We see it as a common-sense and reasonable inference that the dramatic circumstances of a recent and very public shooting war between rival drug factions would likely be discussed by a member of one of the factions."

How would you express this inference in your ITO?

Here's my "blame the evidence" approach:

1. The Manitoba Court of Appeal said in R. v. Wahabi, 2024 MBCA 70, “It is a reasonable inference that persons who are known to one another and who trust one another are likely to speak to one another about areas of mutual interest and concern”.
2. The fact that Mr Wahabi, his brother and Mr Hagos all belonged to the same gang makes me think that the brother's murder would have weighed heavily on the survivor's minds.
3. Their membership in the gang makes me think that they likely trusted each other, and this death held great mutual interest and concern.
   
4. Like the Manitoba Court of Appeal, I infer that they would have talked about it.
5. Therefore, if nothing else, I expect that the jail phone recordings will likely confirm that Mr Wahabi had a motive for the final murder.
6. Furthermore, the confidential sources asserted that Wahabi and Hagos planned the final murder. Other communications would have been difficult while Hagos remained in jail, I infer that these recordings likely captured that planning.
   

2025.06.09 Traffic Tickets and Murder - The Importance of Doing Routine Tasks Correctly and Documenting

At 2:38am, Sgt Sidhu stopped a car for speeding, and running a red light. Considering the time of night, the traffic offences probably posed little danger to the public. But other dangers sometimes haunt the hours after midnight.

Sgt Sidhu approached the driver's side of the car and explained the reason for the traffic stop. The driver, Mr Rhoden, shook and his hands trembled. The driver produced a driver's licence, but could not produce ownership or insurance documentation. The passenger, Mr Anderson, 2025 ONCA 408, remained cool as a cucumber. He dug about in the glovebox looking for documents, and gave the officer what he found, including a take-out menu. But not the vehicle documentation.

Sgt Sidhu began to suspect that they occupied a stolen car. He asked the passenger for identification. The passenger gave a name (which turned out to be false), but denied possessing any id. He said he expected to be able to get into the bar without identification.

Several minutes after stopping the vehicle, Cst Sidhu asked where they were going in such a hurry. The explained that they fled for their safety from a shooting at the Cameo Lounge - a shisha bar only 100m away.

The delay seemed odd. You would expect most people who feared for their lives would express their concerns more urgently when a police officer stopped them for speeding or blowing a red light. Wouldn't you expect the driver to show relief rather than anxiety when a uniformed police officer turned up? If feared harm from gunmen, wouldn't they explain the danger to the officer, rather than wait for the shooter to approach?

Sgt Sidhu returned to his car computer to run some checks. Moments later, the radio informed him of a shooting incident at the Cameo Lounge.

What would you do?

Sgt Sidhu now suspected that these guys might be the shooters.

He called for backup, and briefed the officers who arrived moments later. They took over. They detained the men for the shooting. The investigation discovered evidence - particularly security video - which supported Cst Sidhu's suspicion. Charges proceeded.

At the attempted murder trial, counsel for Anderson and Rhoden challenged Sgt Sidhu's actions. They claimed:

1. Sgt Sidhu detained them both without explaining why;
2. Sgt Sidhu had no grounds to detain them for possessing a stolen car;
   
3. He failed to tell them that they could get legal advice.

The first paragraph of the trial judge's decision complained that Sgt Sidhu forgot to turn on his audio recording device. A recording would have answered the first two questions without the bother of testimony.

Without it, the trial judge had to assess Sgt Sidhu's reliability as a witness.

Sgt Sidhu made that job more difficult by contradicting himself on questions about whether he heard Rhoden give other officers permission to search the vehicle.

However, the trial judge believed Sgt Sidhu, recognizing that this simple traffic matter escalated rapidly into a major investigation, which distracted the officer from noting some ordinary things.

The judges agreed that Sgt Sidhu had good reason to stop the vehicle for the traffic offence.

They disagreed that during the traffic stop, Sgt Sidhu detained Anderson, the passenger.

Obviously, pulling over a vehicle detains the driver ... but not necessarily the passengers. It depends upon how you treat them. The judges relied on the officer's testimony that he asked for, but did not demand that the passenger produce identification. Had Sgt Sidhu demanded it, or told Anderson to show his hands, or to get out, or to stay in the vehicle, then he could have caused Anderson to believe - reasonably - that he was no longer free. That would have triggered a detention at very beginning of the interaction, with serious consequences for the prosecution at the end.

The judges agreed with Sgt Sidhu that the odd behaviour of the car and the men in it raised real concerns that it might be stolen.

Sgt Sidhu never told the men of a detention in relation to a stolen car. But there wasn't time.

What can we learn from Sgt Sidhu's experience?

1. Figure out your body-cams and your car-cams. Develop professional habits of turning them on and off. Judges like having recordings of the investigations of serious incidents. You will never know which trivial incidents will become serious; but you will have good reasons for turning the devices on and off.
2. Follow procedure, even in the trivial investigations. Avoid detaining if you don't need to. By treating the passenger differently from the driver, Sgt Sidhu avoided detaining him. That led to valuable fruits in the investigation afterwards.
3. When other officers arrive to take over, keep taking notes. The bigger the case, the more likely you'll be challenged on everything. Not just what you did, but what you saw other officers do.
   

2025.06.09 Traffic Tickets and Murder - How Long can you Detain a Suspect?

This article picks up from the story above. The officers that took over for Sgt Sidhu formally detained Mr Rhoden and Mr Anderson, 2025 ONCA 408. The officers kept the suspects waiting for two hours before arresting them.

You know that you can detain people that you reasonably suspect of a crime. But nobody who knows what they are talking about has yet told you precisely how long you can detain suspects before you must arrest or release them.

I won't either. Nor did these judges.

But they did say something useful:

“[t]he purpose of the brief detention contemplated under the investigative detention power is to allow the police to take investigative steps that are readily at hand to confirm their suspicion and arrest the suspect or, if the suspicion is not confirmed, release the suspect”

Complexity justifies taking more time.

This shooting injured three people, rendering one of them quadraplegic. It happened at a busy social venue. Lots of potential victims. Lots of potential witnesses. Lots of investigators. Guns were involved. One of the suspects apparently lied about his name.

This complexity justified taking 2 hours to figure out what to do.

Simpler cases do not.

The judges criticized the officers for not investigating Mr Anderson's identity promptly, but recognized that the officers had their hands full.

2025.06.09 Traffic Tickets and Murder - Interviewing Dos and Don'ts

This article continues the story from the previous two. (Will Waldock never shut up about this case?)

Back at the police station, after police told Rhoden and Anderson, 2019 ONSC 2739 that they were under arrest for murder, an investigator tried asking them questions.

Mr Rhoden clammed up.

The interviewer tried a different tactic with Mr Anderson.

The interviewer knew that Mr Anderson and Mr Rhoden told Sgt Sidhu that they were innocent bystanders fleeing gunshots. But the interviewer also knew that investigators at the scene found some evidence implicating them.

Instead of cautioning him as a suspect, the interviewer told Mr Anderson that he was just a witness.

The trial judge didn't like that. It was a trick that rendered the statement inadmissible. As a uniformed police officer, if you have reasonable grounds to believe that the person you are interviewing about a crime is the culprit, then you should tell them. Detained or not, they have a right to choose whether or not to speak about the crime.

Also, an officer told Mr Anderson that he wouldn't be released until he told police his real name. Mr Anderson finally gave his real name. The trial judge didn't like tactic that either. That was an improper inducement - an offer of freedom in exchange for information.

The astute reader will notice that I provided only the trial judge's decision. That's because the Court of Appeal didn't deal with these issues.